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THE COALITION AND QUANGOS  
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Attitudes to quangos are paradoxical. On the one hand they are perceived to be 
undemocratic, unaccountable organizations, whilst on the other they are seen to 
improve effectiveness, limit political interference and increase public confidence in 
government. This paradox is reflected in the behavior of political parties which 
generally adopt a harsh line towards quangos in opposition, but come to rely on these 
bodies in office. Ahead of the 2010 general election it was, however, noticeable that the 
Conservative Party rejected this dynamic by promising to pursue µDPRUHsophisticated 
DSSURDFK¶7KLVDUWLFOHH[SORUHVWKHFRDOLWLRQJRYHUQPHQW¶VVXEVHTXHQWµSublic bodies 
reform pURJUDPPH¶, assessing its progress against recommendations contained within 
WKH,QVWLWXWHIRU*RYHUQPHQW¶VRead Before Burning report of July 2010. It concludes 
that whilst the Coalition has addressed long-standing concerns about the day-to-day 
governance of public bodies it has failed to resolve a set of broader and strategic 
(meta-governance) issues.  
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7KH µTXDQJR FRQXQGUXP¶ DV 7RP *DVK DQG -LOO 5XWWHU QRWHG LQ Political Quarterly in the 
aftermath of the 2010 General Election, refers to the well-known and oft-observed pattern in 
which political parties commit themselves to far-UHDFKLQJDEROLWLRQDQGUHVWUXFWXULQJRIµWKH
TXDQJR VWDWH¶ ZKLOH LQ RSSRVLWLRQ EXW WKHQ DGRSW D far less aggressive approach once in 
power.1 7KLVµUKHWRULF-UHDOLW\JDS¶FDQEHWUDFHGEDFNWKURXJKRXWWKHWZHQWLHWKFHQWXU\DQGLV
by no means an exclusive feature of British politics.2 Ahead of the 2010 General Election 
quangos once again rose up the political agenda, but whilst anti-quango rhetoric was evident 
it appeared that the Conservative Party were adopting a different approach. Indeed, ahead of 
the 2010 General Election David Cameron contended: 
 
It would be far too simplistic for me to stand here and announce some kind of 'Bonfire of the 
4XDQJRV¶3HRSOHKDYHKHDUGWKDWNLQGRIWDONPDQ\WLPHVEHIRUHDQGVHHQOLWWOHWRVKRZIRULW
We need a more sophisticated approach. Yes we need to reduce the number, size, scope and 
influence of quangos. But we also need to recognize that there are circumstances where 
functions of the state do need to be carried out independently of elected politicians.3 
 
To ZKDW GHJUHH KDV WKH FRDOLWLRQ JRYHUQPHQW VROYHG WKH µTXDQJR FRQXQGUXP¶ WKURXJK WKH
LQWURGXFWLRQRIDµPRUHVRSKLVWLFDWHGDSSURDFK¶"7KLVTXHVWLRQSURYLGHVWKHFRUHIRFXVRIWKLV
article. It concludes WKDW DOWKRXJK WKH FRDOLWLRQ¶V µSublic bodies reform agenGD¶ FDQQRW EH
dismissed as cosmetic or insignificant WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶Vfailure to adopt a strategic approach 
to the governance of public bodies in toto means that the µquango conundrum¶ remains 
unresolved. This conclusion is based on a three-year research project that has examined 
governmental and parliamentary reports, has undertaken over 150 interviews with ministers, 
officials and those holding senior positions within ALBs and has then tested its core 
conclusions within a number of practitioner workshops before further stress-testing its 
findings through participation in a number of select committee inquires in both the House of 
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Commons and the House of Lords. In order to present the findings of this research this article 
is divided into three sections. The first section explores the context of quango reform and 
specifically examines the Institute for Government (IfG)¶VRead Before Burning report of July 
2010 which presented a blue print for public body reform capable of avoiding the quango-
conundrum. Against this marker the second section examines the coalition gRYHUQPHQW¶V 
public bodies reform agenda, specifically considering their actions in light of nine 
recommendations made in the Read Before Burning report. The final section then reflects 
upon the outcomes and future of quango reform.  
 
I. READ BEFORE BURNING 
 
The position of quangos ± RU ZKDW DUH WHUPHG KHUH DUP¶V-length bodies (ALBs) or public 
bodies ± is much maligned within British politics. Whilst relying on this form of governance 
politicians (and political commentators) attack quangos as unaccountable, profligate and 
bureaucratic and pledge to remove them from the political system. This paradox has produced 
a recurring rhetoric-reality gap around quangos evident during 0UV7KDWFKHU¶V\HDUVLQSRZHU
when a reduction in the number of non-departmental public bodies (NDPBs - one specific 
RUJDQL]DWLRQDO IRUP RI µTXDQJR¶ was accompanied by the creation of new local public 
spending bodies that were not recognized in the IRUPDO µTXDQJR FRXQW¶4 Similarly under 
Tony %ODLU¶V OHDGHUVKLS DQ DWWHPSW WR SODFH µWKH TXDQJR VWDWH LQ KLVWRU\¶V GXVWELQ ZKHUH LW
belongs¶ was accompanied by the creation of new bodies including Regional Development 
Agencies and the Equality and Human Rights Commission. Such outcomes reflect a form of 
ad hoc empiricism where new bodies are created to solve specific problems with little 
consistency of approach, a method which has resulted in a complex ALB landscape. Not even 
ministers or officials, let alone parliamentarians or academics, know exactly how many ALBs 
H[LVW RU H[DFWO\ ZKDW WKH\ GR 7KH DQLPDOV LQ WKH %ULWLVK µDGPLQLVWUDWLYH ]RR¶ ± to adopt 
7RELDV%DFK¶VSKUDVH± are therefore diverse with some hived-in, some hived-out, some non-
statutory, some statutory, some government-wide, some departmentally-specific, and many 
that simply defy definition and had been created by executive fiat. 5  This is problematic 
because it curtails GHSDUWPHQW¶V DELOLW\ WR understand and manage ALBs, leading to the 
continued existence of organizations which are no longer required, the possibility of poor 
management or efficiency, or limited accountability. These deficiencies have been recognized 
in the findings of a vast number of parliamentary inquiries, government committees, 
academic studies and think tank reports which pinpoint a serious breakdown in public body 
governance.6  
 
It is in this context that the IfG sought to provide a road map for quango reform which argued 
for a more mature, thoughtful and principled ± some might say very un-British ± approach to 
the management of ALBs. Their report argued for a move away from the knee-MHUNµTXDQJR
FXOOV¶RUµQXPEHUVJDPHV¶pursued by previous governments in favor of a more consistent and 
transparent treatment of ALBs. This led to the formation of nine recommendations listed in 
Table 1.  
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7DEOH7KH,QVWLWXWHIRU*RYHUQPHQW¶VRead Before Burning: Main Recommendations 
THEME RECOMMENDATION RATIONALE 
Micro-Political  
Capacity Bolster the capacity of the Cabinet 
Office to oversee and support 
GHSDUWPHQW¶Vvis-à-vis ALBs. 
The capacity of the Cabinet Office had 
been gradually reduced throughout the 
preceding two decades. 
Review Introduce regular Governance and 
Performance (GAP) reviews to ensure 
that all departments and ALBs are 
delivering against their responsibilities. 
Quinquennial reviews had been abolished 
since 2005 and Landscape Reviews and 
End-to-End reviews had been conducted 
on an ad hoc basis. 
Sponsorship Managing the departmental-ALB 
interface should be recognised as a key 
skill within Whitehall through support, 
training and mentoring. 
Sponsorship had never been recognised 
as a professional or valued skill despite 
LWVUROHLQDUP¶V-length management. 
Meso-Political 
Transparency Provide a complete list of all NDPBs 
alongside broader administrative 
transparency requirements. 
The Public Bodies yearbook had been 
discontinued and information and data 
remained partial and dispersed. 
Approval Establish a more robust process of 
parliamentary scrutiny for the creation 
of new ALBs.  
Greater legislative oversight would act as 
a check on the creation of new bodies.  
Control Focus on control frameworks in order to 
achieve an appropriate balance between 
independence and autonomy.  
Poor balance between autonomy and 
control with ALBs enduring either micro-
management or (more commonly) µSRRU
SDUHQWLQJ¶. 
Macro-Political 
Acceptance Acknowledge that some public functions 
DUH EHVW SODFHG DW DUP¶V-length from 
elected ministers. 
Previous negative depiction of quangos 
by politicians, despite reliance on ALBs. 
Culling Avoid the traditional post-election 
µTXDQJR FXOO¶ LQ IDYRXU of a more 
strategic approach. 
Previous governments had played the 
µTXDQJR QXPEHUV JDPH¶ LQ D VRFLR-
SROLWLFDOµLVVXH-DWWHQWLRQF\FOH¶ 
Governance Introduce a new and simpler taxonomy 
of governance based around five main 
organisational forms. 
The existing structure had evolved in a 
dysfunctional manner and was no longer 
µILWIRUSXUSRVH¶ 
 
1RWH7KH ,QVWLWXWH IRU*RYHUQPHQW¶V Read Before Burning report of July 2010 also made recommendations in relation to the 
National Audit Office and Office of the Commissioner for Public Appointments that are beyond the scope of this article. On the 
latter theme see, )OLQGHUV 0DQG *HGGHV 0  µ2XWODZLQJ WKH 6SRLOV 0LQLVWHULDO 3DWURQDJH DQG 3DUOLDPHQWDU\ 3RZHU¶
Contemporary British History, forthcoming. 
 
 
As Table 1 illustrates, the recommendations contained in the Read Before Burning report can 
be divided across three levels. At the micro-specific level recommendations reflected the need 
for a more detailed understanding and management of ALBs. The limited capacity of the 
Cabinet Office and the abolition of quinquennial reviews (the mechanisms for periodically 
reviewing ALBs) in 2003 was seen to have created a governance vacuum in which neither 
departments or central government were consistently regulating public bodies. As such 
recommendations emphasized the need for more capacity to monitor and manage ALBs, for 
stronger review processes and better sponsorship arrangements.  
 
Beyond these specific recommendations Read Before Burning tackled meso-political issues 
and challenges pertaining to transparency, approval and control. The IfG engaged with an 
ongoing debate around the uncertainty of the quango landscape and the need for greater 
transparency. Their report echoed calls made by the Public Administration Select Committee 
(PASC)¶VUHSRUWMapping the Quango State of 2001 and its Smaller Government: Shrinking 
the Quango State for greater clarity in the sphere of quasi-government, asserting the 
importance of clear and readily available information if trust in quangos is to improve. The 
IfG also directed attention to the issue of approval for the creation of new bodies and the 
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limitations of unfettered ministerial power. Recognizing the challenges posed by 
µLQVWLWXWLRQDOLWLV¶LH WKHpropensity to respond to every new challenge or problem with the 
creation of a new quango) the report returned to the possible solution offered by a 
commitment made by the Labour Government in 1997 to give select committees certain 
ratification and oversight powers over the creation of new bodies. As such it recognized 
repeated calls for greater transparency and accountability as a means of ensuring that new 
bodies were created on a more stable and sustainable footing. These UHSRUW¶V meso-
recommendations also raised the issue of control, echoing a raft of reports which had 
highlighted the existence of generally weak control relationships between departments and 
quangos. In spite of the need for autonomy the Alexander Report of 2002, found that many 
SXEOLFERGLHVZHUH VRZHDNO\ FRQWUROOHG WKDW WKH\KDGHIIHFWLYHO\ DVVXPHG µRUSKDQ VWDWXV¶, 
indicating the need for greater oversight and control. Parliamentary and National Audit Office 
UHSRUWV LQWRVSHFLILFERGLHV UHSHDWHGO\FDPH WRVLPLODUFRQFOXVLRQVDQGDQDUUDWLYHRI µSRRU
SDUHQWLQJ¶ZDVGRPLQDQWDFURVV:KLWHKDOOLQWKHUXQXSWRWKH0 General Election. In this 
context the IfG called for a more determined focus of ALB control specifically through 
improvements in the sponsorship of public bodies.  
 
The final three recommendations provided a more macro-political focus on the politics of 
public bodies reform by focusing on culling, acceptance and governance. These 
recommendations reacted against the prevailing culture of quango governance, calling for a 
move away from ad hoc management and reform and the negative depiction of quangos 
towards a more positive, uniform and strategic system of ALB governance. Taken together 
these nine recommendations represented an evidence-based recipe for the µmore sophisticated 
DSSURDFK¶ that David Cameron had promised if he became Prime Minister. Moreover, the 
report was non-partisan in outlook and appeared to chime with the desire for quango reform 
voiced by all three of the main political parties. This was reflected in the UHSRUW¶V IRUZDUG
where Lord Bichard (himself a former quango chairman and former departmental permanent 
VHFUHWDU\QRWHGµIn the past, public discourse on ALBs has been characterized by more heat 
than light. We want to change that ± which is why we ask government and people interested 
in the future of DUP¶V-length government to Read EHIRUH %XUQLQJ¶.7 Whether the coalition 
government read the report is unknown, but the degree to which their reforms responded to 
the diagnosed problems and mirrored its recommendations forms the focus of the next 
section.   
 
II. THE COALITION AND QUANGOS 
 
The central argument of this article is that although the Coalition Government has overseen 
the introduction of a far-reaching quango reform agenda it has not solved the basic and 
IXQGDPHQWDO µTXDQJR FRQXQGUXP¶ from which a broad range of secondary challenges 
(accountability, transparency, control, etc.) flow. The government focused their reform 
programme on just one organizational form of DUP¶V-length body - NDPBs ± a narrow 
approach which neglected the opportunity to substantially reform and re-envisage the public 
bodies landscape. In order to explain the empirical basis of this argument this section 
examines each of the nine themes, and subsequent recommendations, that were included in 
the II*¶V Read Before Burning report (Table 1, above). The main arguments of this section 
are set out in Table 2 (below) and are explored in detail below. 
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Table 2. Assessment of Public Bodies Reform 2010-2014 
THEME REFORM ASSESSMENT 
Micro-Political  
Capacity The capacity of the Cabinet Office has been bolstered through 
additional staffing and strong and stable ministerial leadership. 
¥¥¥ 
Review Triennial reviews have been created to periodically review all 
NDPBs but questions remain about their scope and form. 
¥¥ 
Sponsorship Training and support for those managing the department-NDPB 
interface has been created, but embedded cultural norms may 
take longer to adjust. 
¥¥ 
Meso-Political 
Transparency Transparency is a key Coalition objective as evident in new date 
requirements around staffing, contracts, etc. for NDPBs but the 
situation for other ALBs is opaque 
¥¥ 
Approval Although Cabinet Office ministers have agreed in principle to a 
role for select committees in ratifying decisions to create new 
bodies this has not been translated into practice. 
¥ 
Control A new controls framework has been implemented that has 
significantly reduced the autonomy and discretion of public 
bodies. 
¥¥¥ 
Macro-Political 
Acceptance  7KH µ0DXGH 5HYLHZ¶ ZDV EDVHG RQ DQ H[SOLFLW DFFHSWDQFH WKDW
ALBs were legitimate in some cases depending on their role. 
However, not all forms of ALB such as special health authorities 
were examined.  
¥¥ 
Culling  The three-tests framework ensured a more strategic approach but 
D µTXDQJRV QXPEHUV JDPH¶ GLG FRPH LQWR SODy as ministers 
announced the abolition of large numbers of usually very small 
advisory NDPBs. 
¥¥ 
Governance Despite recognising the need to overhaul and tidy-up the 
institutional landscape beyond departments the coalition rejected 
moving to a new and simpler taxonomy. The result has been a 
failure of meta-JRYHUQDQFHDQGTXHVWLRQVDERXWµ3KDVH¶UHIRUP 
X 
 
 
Micro-Political: Capacity, Review, Sponsorship 
 
In terms of bolstering the capacity of the Cabinet Office, in general, and the Public Bodies 
7HDPLQSDUWLFXODULWLVGLIILFXOWWRDYRLGWKHFRQFOXVLRQWKDWDVLJQLILFDQWµILOOLQJ-LQ¶RIWKH
µKROORZLQJ-RXW¶KDVWDNHQSODFHVLQFH0D\From the 1.5 (full-time equivalent) staff it 
had enjoyed during 2006-2010 the Public Bodies Team was expanded to 17 staff. 
Furthermore the Public Bodies Team was bolstered by the creation of associated units such as 
the Commercial Models Team and the Shared Services Team that sit within the 
Transformation Cluster in the Cabinet Office.8 A second less tangible change came in the 
form of a Minister of State who sat in the Cabinet and was personally committed to the public 
bodies reform agenda. The post of Minister for the Cabinet Office is generally not viewed as 
a senior Government position (indeed, it is often associated with polite demotion) and 
ministerial tenure is generally brief (from May 1997 to May 2010, for example, 12 
individuals held this position with an average tenure of 11 months). Having a stable Minister 
of State, in the form of Francis Maude, who had held that post since 2 July 2007, and a well 
resourced public bodies team was critical for maintaining the profile and momentum of 
reform, resulting in significant advances in departmental sponsorship and control.  
In terms of review, the IfG PDGH UHFRPPHQGDWLRQV IRU µ*RYHUQDQFH DQG 3HUIRUPDQFH¶ RU
µGAP¶ reviews to occur every three to five years for ALBs spending over £50 million, with 
smaller scale exercises for bodies with less budget. These would examine ERGLHV¶governance, 
financial and resource management, delivery and capability performance, and the roles and 
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responsibilities of bodies and departments. In 2011 the coalition introduced a system of 
triennial reviews which examined the function and form of NDPBs as a means of advancing 
ongoing reform. Since their inception these reviews have secured some change with 
recommendations to, for example, abolish Equality 2025 and reclassify the Criminal Injuries 
Compensation Authority as an Executive Agency, but the majority of ALBs have remained 
and been subject to only minor recommendations for improvements in governance (a perhaps 
unsurprising outcome given the recent advent of the 2010 reform programme). Whilst 
providing a means of review triennials are, however, seen to replicate many of the problems 
encountered with previous quinquennial reviews and do not specifically address the need 
cited by the IfG to focus on both the ALB and its interface with its sponsoring department.9 
As such there are indicators that triennials require further development ± a point recognised 
by the Cabinet Office who are taking steps to revise the 2011 guidance.   
Although not connected to the triennial review process the Coalition Government has pushed 
forward reforms on sponsorship. Until the summer of 2010 a focus on how public bodies 
were - let alone how they should be - sponsored had effectively formed a governance vacuum 
at the heart of British government. This was an issue that had been raised several times by the 
PASC during 1997-2010 but was only tackled head-on by the Conservative-Liberal Democrat 
coalition. As such one of the most innovative features of the public bodies reform agenda was 
its focus on sponsorship which inspired the creation of a new cross-Whitehall sponsorship 
network and sponsorship champion, a new sponsorship competency framework, sponsorship 
training opportunities and sponsor induction pack. And yet, despite these improvements 
questions remain about the degree to which the culture of the civil service - particularly the 
senior civil service - has adapted to view these management and administrative skills as of 
HTXDO YDOXH WR µWUDGLWLRQDO¶ policy-making skills, suggesting that further time is needed to 
judge the success of these changes.  
 
Meso-Political: Transparency, Approval, Control 
As Table 2 (above) suggests, the Coalition Government have implemented many of the 
micro-political elements of Read Before Burning but progress became more difficult as the 
scale of the issues concerned became larger and more political. In relation to transparency, 
however, the coalition has implemented a raft of reforms as part of an attempt to increase 
transparency across the public sector. Such reforms are significant as they allow scrutiny of 
the quango landscape enabling observers to gauge the extent and value of ALBs. The 
Government have taken steps on transparency by publishing details on the number and size of 
NDPBs through Public Bodies, an annual report that was recommenced in 2012 after a three 
year hiatus (prompted by the upheaval around the 2010 review). In addition they implemented 
a range of administrative controls from 2010 designed to monitor and control public 
spending. Accordingly ALBs were required to publish details of how much senior officials 
are paid, every line of government spending above £25k, every contract worth over £10k 
(plus the actual contract in full) plus other measures, all of which are monitored by a new 
3XEOLF 6HFWRU 7UDQVSDUHQF\ %RDUG $W D EURDGHU OHYHO WKH LQWURGXFWLRQ RI µ:KROH RI
*RYHUQPHQW $FFRXQWV¶ D FRQVROLGDWHG VHW RI ILQDQFLDO VWDWHPHQWV IRU DURXQG 
organizations across the public sector provide new levels of transparency, delivering 
comparable accounts by which to assess government organizations. Additionally, as part of 
WKHµ&OHDU/LQHRI6LJKW$OLJQPHQW¶SURMHFWWKHH[SHQGLWXUHRI1'3%VLVQRZLQFRUSRUDWHG
into the Estimates and Resource Accounts of sponsoring departments which, in turn, ensures 
that Permanent Secretaries (as Accounting Officers) pay far more attention to the governance 
of public bodies. The coalition has not, however, provided a complete list of all ALBs (i.e. 
the wider institutional landscape beyond NDPBs) and the specific transparency arrangements 
surrounding the new raft of mutualisations and joint-ventures (around 70 have been 
established since 2010 controlling over one billion pounds of public expenditure), nor do they 
provide data on WKH LQFUHDVLQJO\ FRPSOH[ µDOWHUQDWLYH PRGHOV RI VHUYLFH GHOLYHU\¶ WKDW WKH
coalition is promoting. As such the transparency agenda is somewhat curtailed.  
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The idea that the House of Commons should have some formal role in relation to the creation 
of new bodies ± especially those not based in statute ± has a long historical pedigree within 
British politics, but only as an idea. In May 1996, for example, the then Shadow Leader of 
WKH +RXVH $QQ 7D\ORU XVHG KHU µ1HZ 3ROLWLFV 1HZ 3DUOLDPHQW¶ speech to Charter 88 to 
suggest that the House of Commons should have a bigger role in approving the creation of 
new quangos but the appetite for such measures dissipated once New Labour won office. 
$OWKRXJK WKH FRDOLWLRQ¶V Programme for Government did not include any commitments in 
relation to strengthening the legislative controls over the creation of new ALBs it did include 
a commitment to empower select committees with the capacity to hold confirmation hearings 
for some senior public DSSRLQWPHQWVDQGWRµH[DPLQHWKHFDVH¶IRUJLYLQJVHOHFWFRPPLWWHHV
the power to block increases in quango-budgets. ,QRIILFHKRZHYHU WKHFRDOLWLRQ¶VSRVLWLRQ
has been slightly more complex. In terms of internal governance and control the Cabinet 
Office has undoubtedly increased its cross-government capacity to regulate and monitor the 
creation of new bodies.10 µ1ew NDPBs will only be set up¶WKHQHZ&DELQHW2IILFHJXLGDQFH
VWDWHV µas a last resort, when consideration of all other delivery mechanisms have been 
H[KDXVWHG¶DQGDµSURSRUWLRQDWHZHOOVWUXFWXUHGDQGFRVWHGEXVLQHVVFDVH¶must be approved 
by Cabinet Office Ministers and, where appropriate, the Treasury.11  In terms of external 
controls over the birth of new NDPBs neither the Conservative Party nor the Liberal 
Democrats had ever pledged to increase the powers of Parliament in the way suggested by the 
IfG in the Read Before Burning report. It therefore took both officials and observers by 
surprise when Francis Maude and Oliver Letwin (Paymaster General in the Cabinet Office) 
responded to a question on the topic during their appearance in front of the PASC in July 
2010 in the following manner.  
Q69 Nick de Bois: Would you give PASC a role in approving new or re-organized DUP¶V-length bodies as, 
I think it was, the Institute for Government recommended? 
Mr Maude: It is not a bad idea actually.  
Mr Letwin: That is a rather attractive idea.  
Mr Maude: So you can take that as a yes. 
 
Four months later Francis Maude repeated his position in front of the committee by arguing µ,
think it is useful for there to be a role [for select committees] in scrutinising and advising on 
the creation of new bodies«2ur view is that there have been too few tripwires along the way 
± too few hurdlHV LQ WKHZD\RISXEOLFERGLHVEHLQJVHWXS¶12 However, no formal role for 
select committees in ratifying the creation of new bodies has been agreed, nor has action been 
taken to implement sunset clauses which define when a body is to be subject to review or is 
expected to close. As such the Government remains unfettered by external forces, meaning 
their capacity to create new bodies is not subject to the kind of democratic check likely to 
counter the quango-conundrum.  
If the capacity of Parliament to exert some form of control over the creation of new quangos 
has not been increased then the capacity of the Cabinet Office to control both NDPBs and 
their sponsoring departments has certainly improved. This is significant as whilst political 
independence is a key virtue of delegated governance it is necessary for departments to exert 
control over the administrative effectiveness and political direction of ALBs to ensure that 
they are fit for purpose, accountable and remain necessary. Under the coalition significant 
emphasis has been placed on tightening control in order to provide departments with greater 
understanding of the role and behaviour of ALBs. These interventions were strengthened 
from September 2010 (without any prior consultation) in the form of the aforementioned new 
expenditure FRQWUROV IUDPHZRUN GHVLJQHG WR LQWURGXFH ZKDW PLQLVWHUV GHILQHG DV µWRXJK
VSHQGLQJFRQWUROVWRWDFNOHXQQHFHVVDU\DQGSRRUO\FRRUGLQDWHGSXEOLFVSHQGLQJ¶13 This new 
controls framework is important for a number of reasons. First and foremost, it reflected the 
increased basic capacity of the Cabinet Office to administer and oversee a multi-dimensional 
cross-governmental controls system when prior to the 2010 General Election it could not even 
maintain a basic list of what ALBs even existed. Secondly, it marked a sudden and dramatic 
limit on the autonomy and discretion that had until that point been enjoyed by public bodies. 
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$V RQH 1'3% FKDLUPDQ SXW LW µZH ZHQW IURP DQ DUP¶V-length relationship with our 
department to a head-lRFN¶7KLVVKLIWLQWKHJRYHUQDQFHRI1'3%VZDVGHVLJQHGWRUHVSRQG
WRFRQFHUQVDERXWWKHH[LVWHQFHRIDµSRRUSDUHQWLQJ¶FXOWXUHRIGHSDUWPHQWDOFRQWURO:LWKLQ
Whitehall the imposition of the new controls framework and the need for departmental and/or 
core executive approval across a broad range of dimensions is commonly captured in the 
ODQJXDJH RI D VKLIW IURP µORRVH-ORRVH¶ WR µWLJKW-WLJKW¶ PDQDJHPHQW. Although initially 
introduced as a temporary measure around the time of the Maude Review (discussed below) 
the controls framework has now lost its transitory status and, as one Cabinet Office official 
QRWHGµ7LJKW-7LJKWLVWKHQHZSHUPDQHQW¶. And yet the Cabinet Office are pursuing a tight-
loose system in which central control is matched by ALB autonomy, signalling that the 
balance between these two variables has not yet been optimised. This leads us to step-back 
once more and consider the degree to which these important mid-range or meso-level reforms 
sit within a broader set of more fundamental macro-political modifications.  
Macro-Political: Acceptance, Culling, Governance 
The themes of µDFFHSWDQFH¶ DQG µFXOOLQJ¶ FDQ EH H[DPLQHG WRJHWKHU DV WKH\ ERWK VHUYH WR
focus attention on what might be termed WKHµ0DXGH5HYLHZ¶DQGVXEVHTXHQWUHIRUPV,QWKLV
UHJDUGRQHRIWKHPRVWVLJQLILFDQWDQGGLVWLQFWLYHHOHPHQWVRIWKHFRDOLWLRQ¶VLQLWLDODSSURDFK
WR µWKH TXDQJR FRQXQGUXP¶ ZDV WKDW it adopted an explicit and principled approach based 
around first, an µH[LVWHQWLDO WHVW¶GRHV WKHERG\DFWXDOO\QHHG WRH[LVWRU LV LWV UROHIXQFWLRQ
now superfluous? ,IWKHDQVZHUZDVµQR¶WKHQWKHERG\FRXOGEHDEROLVKHGEXWLIWKHDQVZHU
ZDVµ\HV¶LWVDUP¶V-length status would only be preserved if it could pass one of the following 
three questions,  
Does it perform a technical function?  
Does it need to be politically impartial?  
Does it act independently to establish facts?  
The Maude Review was launched within days of the coalition taking office and involved the 
assessment of all ALBs (but not executive agencies) against these tests. The review was not 
perfect. As the January 2011 report by the PASC ± Smaller Government: Shrinking the 
Quango State ± noted there were clearly anomalies in how the tests had been applied by 
departments, and some ALBs seemed to have been overlooked, but the significance of this 
review process should not be ignored. No previous government had adopted such an explicit 
framework of assessment, the ORJLFWKDWµTXDQJRVDUHEDG¶had clearly been rejected in favor 
of what can only be described as µa more sophisticated approach¶ and this led to a reform 
agenda that was arguably more focused on reform than on abolition. The Maude Review 
involved the assessment of over 900 ALBs and the results were announced in the House of 
Commons on 14 November 2010. Nearly 200 bodies would be abolished, 118 merged and 
171 substantially reformed. The Public Bodies Act 2011 was passed to give the reform 
programme a statutory basis and by the end of 2013 Cabinet Office statistics suggest that the 
µTXDQJRKHDGFRXQW¶KDVEHHQUHGXFHGE\ERGLHV:KHWKHUWKLVDPRXQWVWRDµERQILUHRI
WKHTXDQJRV¶RUDVRQH/DERXU03SXWLW, µPRUHRIDGDPS6XQGD\DIWHUQRRQEDUEHTXH¶is a 
contested point. The basic facts of the reform agenda are:  
1. The UHIRUPSURFHVVKDVIRFXVHGRQMXVWRQHIRUPRIDUP¶V-length body (i.e. Non-Departmental 
Public Bodies). 
  
2. The vast majority of abolished bodies were very small advisory NDPBs. 
 
3. ,QPDQ\FDVHVµDEROLWLRQ¶KDVDFWXDOO\ veiled the immediate reincarnation of the body in the 
form of a new executive agency (i.e. hived-LQDUP¶V-length body) or a committee of experts.  
 
4. 9HU\ IHZ RI WKH ODUJH H[HFXWLYH 1'3%V ZHUH DIIHFWHG E\ WKH FRDOLWLRQ¶V UHIRUP DJHQGD LQ
terms of abolition or reform. 
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5. The reform emphasis has been on tightening internal control rather than large-scale abolition.  
 
6. Nearly 45 billion pounds of public expenditure is channeled through NDPBs and this figure 
will increase to nearly 150 billion when the budget of the newly created NHS England is 
added to the official statistics. 
As Table 2 (above) suggests the Maude Review and the subsequent reform agenda have to a 
large extent mirrorHG WKH ,I*¶V UHFRPPHQGDWLRQV LQ UHODWLRQ WR ERWK DFFHSWLQJ D UROH IRU
delegated governance within public governance and also to avoiding any knee-jerk and 
XQSULQFLSOHG FXOO SURFHVV 7KH GHVLJQDWLRQ RI RQO\ µWZR WLFNV¶ KRZHYHU for each of these 
themes in Table 2 reflects WKHFRDOLWLRQ¶Vdecision to avoid what the IfG referred WRDVµUDdical 
FKDQJH¶E\WDNLQJDµIXQGDPHQWDOORRNDWWKHFODVVLILFDWLRQRIERGLHV¶LQRUGHUWRLQMHFWVRPH
form of coherence and clarity across what was an incredibly complex and untidy 
administrative landscape,QWHUPVRIWKHµELJJHUSLFWXUH¶LWZDVWKLVPDFUR-political focus on 
the meta-governance (i.e. the government of governance) that arguably offered the big 
opportunity for the coalition to institute far-reaching and long-lasting change by clarifying the 
landscape. It was also a measure that enjoyed a broad cross-section of support ± the PASC 
used its December 2010 report to XUJHWKHFRDOLWLRQWRµuse its triennial review process to re-
examine the proper governance arrangements for each public body and place them in a new 
simplified taxonomy¶. The government, however, was not persuaded. While accepting that 
the labyrinthine structure of ALBs was µYHU\ XQWLG\¶ 0DXGH proceeded to provide a 
remarkable glimpse of the executive mentality when he explained that he was 
µtemperamentally slightly allergic to trying to create a top-down overall scheme of 
arrangement for all of this, but it is very complex and confusing, and simplification is 
desirable, but I think not in order to meet the demands of administrative tidiness¶.14 The 
paradox of the coalition gRYHUQPHQW¶VDSSURDFKWRµWKHTXDQJRSUREOHP¶LVWKHUHIRUHWKDWWKH\
have injected greater transparency and control over just one layer of ALBs (i.e. NDPBs) 
while at the same time increasing delegation, fragmentation and complexity elsewhere. 
Therefore as the 2015 General Election looms on the political horizon, and the unintended 
consequences of this rather myopic approach to reform becomes more obvious, the big 
question for all the major parties is - Where next for quango reform? 
III. QUANGO REFORM ± WHERE NEXT? 
 
This article has presented the results of the first major research project to track and assess the 
&RDOLWLRQ*RYHUQPHQW¶VµSublic bodies reform pURJUDPPH¶7KHUHFRPPHQGDWLRQVFRQWDLQHG
LQWKH,I*¶VRead Before Burning report of 2010 were used a useful heuristic through which 
WR DVVHVV WKH SDFH DQG VLJQLILFDQFH RI WKH FRDOLWLRQ JRYHUQPHQW¶V UHIRUPV ,W PLJKW EH
concluded from the findings summarized in Table 2 (above) that the coalition did µUHDGEHIRUH
burQLQJ¶LQWKHVense that a clear synergy exists between the ,I*¶Vrecommendations and the 
JRYHUQPHQW¶V VXEVHTXHQW UHIRUPV +RZHYHU WKHKRRN WZLVW RU EDUE LQ WKH ILQGLQJV RI WKLV
UHVHDUFKVXJJHVWWKDWWKHFRDOLWLRQKDVQRWVROYHGWKHµTXDQJRFRQXQGUXP¶EHFDXVHDWWKHOHYHO
of meta-JRYHUQDQFHLWUHIXVHGWRDGRSWµDPRUHVWUDWHJLFDSSURDFK¶to paraphrase Gash and 
Rutter. Significant reforms to impose control and inject order into the design of the state have 
EHHQQDUURZO\IRFXVHGRQMXVWRQHOD\HURUVSHFLHVRIDUP¶V-length body without any clear 
rationale for (1) why sLPLODUPHDVXUHVZHUHQ¶WVLPLODUO\DSSURSULDWH IRURWKHU OD\HUVRU 
how the centripetal logic of WKHµSublic bodies reform pURJUDPPH¶FDQEHUHFRQFLOHGZLWKWKH
centrifugal logic of reforms in other sectors (most notably, but not exclusively, in the health 
VHFWRU/RFDWHGZLWKLQWKHFRQWRXUVRI)OLQGHUV¶WKHVLVWKH%ULWLVKVWDWHZRXOGDSSHDU
VWLOOWREHµZDONLQJZLWKRXWRUGHU¶15  
 
What quango choices might face the incoming May 2015 government?  First, there will be 
limited room to further reform NDPBs, given they will have all been through the Maude 
review and in many cases a triennial. The functions they perfoUPDQGWKHQHHGIRUWKHLUDUP¶V-
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length status will have been tested. However a bold government could address the need for 
greater clarity in the distinctions between ALBs, as Read Before Burning and other have 
suggested. One way would be to dissolve the indistinct boundary between executive NDPBs 
and executive agencies. As the 2002 Alexander Report noted, and Thomas (OVWRQ¶V UHFHQW
research confirms,16 the rationale for delegating functions to one or the other is by no means 
clear.  Indeed, a number of NDPBs were simply turned into executive agencies as a result of 
the Maude review. Secondly, the transparency gap between NDPBs and outsourced public 
services will become more obvious. Government transparency has entered the digital age with 
the commitment to publish details of expenditure. But this does not apply to the way in which 
Capita, G4S and other outsourcing companies spend the public money they receive, since this 
is regarded as commercially sensitive. Similarly, NDPBs¶ framework agreements and 
business plans are public, setting out what the government wants them to achieve, their 
performance targets and budgets. But the contracts government has with private companies 
are private, although some local authorities are now starting to publish redacted versions. It is 
unlikely the incoming 2015 government will try to turn the clock back on contracting out, and 
so it will need to address the growing discrepancy in transparency of public service 
performance and delivery. Third, the new government will need to look at the composition of 
NDPB boards, especially for executive NDPBs. Recruitment to these bodies has often 
focused on business skills, but these organizations provide public services. The consumer 
voice is seldom heard in board meetings, and without significant changes to board culture and 
structure token representation will have little effect. The consumer movement has 
considerable experience in effective representation, and the incoming government should turn 
here for advice.   
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